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THE ISCIP ANALYST 
Volume 8, Number 3 (February 19, 2003) 
 
Russian Federation: Executive Branch 
By Michael Comstock and Scott Dullea 
 
Subtle warning to the interior ministry  
In a recent speech at the interior ministry, President Vladimir Putin warned that 
there is one area of Russian society that should not be touched: "I want to stress 
that the involvement of Interior Ministry officials in corporate wars and 
commercial disputes is especially dangerous. I ask you to keep away from them." 
Putin then went on to reassure officials about the ministry's much-anticipated 
reform. "Any possible actions concerning such an intricate and important body as 
the Interior Ministry must be double-checked and aim solely at raising its 
efficiency. There will be no revolutions, I say. Any moves will take the opinion of 
the ministry into consideration and will be very delicate," he said. What is most 
significant about his remarks is that he made them at all. Until now the Kremlin 
has been relatively tight-lipped about its internal housekeeping. Now there is little 
doubt that some reform will occur. And, regardless of how "delicate" is the reform 
that eventually takes place, it will be a significant event, given the ministry's 
importance. Thus, Putin delivered a double-headed warning: Stay out of the way 
of business, and get ready because change is coming. (TVS, 1200 GMT, 6 Feb 
03; via ISI Emerging Markets Database) 
 
Gazprom as a financial instrument of the executive  
Meanwhile, the reform of energy giant Gazprom increasingly is being viewed as 
a sideshow to cover what is, in reality, a large-scale financial operation for 
indirect funding of President Putin's election campaign.  
 
According to a recent report, the installation of Alexei Miller as head of Gazprom 
was intended to "preserve the company as the main political and financial 
 2 
resource for the Kremlin." Miller has attempted to achieve this purpose by 
defeating proposed reforms that would break up the corporation. 
(KOMMERSANT-VLAST, 3 Feb 03; via ISI Emerging Markets Database) 
However, Gazprom's financial problems are considerable, and reform is needed 
if it is to serve as a cash cow for the Kremlin. The real intention is to achieve the 
best way to keep Moscow's hands on the purse strings, while keeping the purse 
from becoming empty. Ironically, at the moment Gazprom's real value lies in its 
unreformed state: A radical change in gas prices is undesirable this close to an 
election year. Moreover, the oligarchs are kept at bay with the promise of reforms 
to come, from which inevitably they will benefit. Hence Putin's recent statement 
backing Miller can be seen as maintaining the status quo, for now: "The state 
does not support any plans to split or break up Gazprom." (THE MOSCOW 
TIMES, 17 Feb 03; via ISI Emerging Markets Database)  
 
PRESIDENCY  
Putin's symbology goes abroad 
From the beginning of his presidential term, Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin has 
employed symbolism to evoke memories of Russian and Soviet glory. As he 
nears the halfway point of his term, his utilization of historical imagery has moved 
to the international level, employing symbols that recall Peter the Great and 
Lenin (interchangeably), and demonstrating to his people (and the world) that 
Russia is back on the global stage. 
 
A Putin cult has developed in Russia. Whatever the cause, the evidence is 
unmistakable. There is a pop song about him and any number of items bearing 
his image can be purchased (from carpets to pocket watches). The cult appears 
to have popular support. (A survey conducted in 2001-2002 by the Public 
Opinion Foundation [FOM] showed that 72.4% of Russians support the president 
and 27.3% of them are unconditionally loyal and would vote for him tomorrow.) 
(VREMYA NOVESTEI, 15 Feb 03; via Johnson's Russia List)  
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Putin is grasping for icon status by identifying his presidency with Russia's more 
powerful periods: On New Year's Day 2001, he reinstated the melody of the 
former Soviet (Stalin) anthem as Russia's new national anthem -- with different 
lyrics, of course (but at the Olympics, no lyrics are heard). In addition to this 
melodic symbol, Putin also has undertaken visible changes, such as restoring the 
Red Banner with a Soviet star as the Russian Army's official flag.  
 
Such imagery is, perhaps, designed merely to cloak in patriotism what really are 
weaknesses in public morale and in military strength. Indeed, some argue that 
Putin's popularity is doomed to decline unless he begins to produce less 
symbolic and more tangible results. (RFE/RL NEWSLINE, 5 Feb 03) However, 
now Putin is taking the show on the road by incorporating his symbology into 
Russian foreign policy.  
 
At a recent commemoration of the Battle of Stalingrad, Putin saw fit to use this 
ceremony to recall historic German-Russian ties, asking his compatriots to 
remember also the German soldiers who fought there (!) (ITAR-TASS, 2 Feb 03; 
FBIS-SOV-2003-0202, via World News Connection) and noting how much the 
Germans (in the person of Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder) respect their former 
adversaries. "Reconciliation and profound relations of friendly partnership 
originate from mutual sufferings of the past," Putin said. Russia and Germany will 
do their best to develop close relations, he added, "because it is our duty to the 
dead." The friendly gestures toward Germany over the past two years, which he 
emphasized in his post-September 11 speech at the Bundestag, signify the 
importance that Russia has placed on being as "European" as it viewed itself 
during the glory days of St. Petersburg as "Russia's window to the West." 
 
The French-German-Russian axis, which he has helped to fashion, was taken 
out of Lenin's playbook by Putin. Lenin advocated the game of exploiting the 
"contradictions among the imperialists" -- playing the Western countries against 
one another until Russia could regain strength. (UPI, 13 Feb 03; via Johnson's 
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Russia List) This type of foreign policy imagery has visible effect both on 
Russians and on the rest of the world. Riding the wave of these renewed Euro-
Russian ties, in an 11 February French TV interview Putin reiterated Charles de 
Gaulle's acknowledgement that Russia is part of Europe. (BBC MONITORING, 
13 Feb 03; via Johnson's Russia List) 
 
Putin also has tried to demonstrate to his supporters at home and to his 
counterparts abroad just how important Russia is becoming by the company it 
keeps. He has hosted leaders from the United States, Great Britain, Italy and 
Pakistan, while Russian influence in areas such as India and China recalls the 
days of the superpower Soviet Empire. 
 
Of course, Putin has shown that he knows the limits of this game of symbols. At 
home he coolly disagreed with a proposal to rename Volgograd and to call it 
Stalingrad once more. (RFE/RL NEWSLINE, 31 Jan 03) Underscoring his 
awareness, despite all the symbolism, of the need to demonstrate that one must 
keep one's distance from the atrocities of Russia's past, Putin recently signed 
legislation which restores the rights of underage children of Stalin-era victims. 
(ITAR-TASS, 10 Feb 03; via Johnson's Russia List) 
 
What does President Putin's use of international and domestic symbols reveal? 
Is it purely camouflage for Russia's real status as an economic and political 
weakling? As he explained to the public before the Duma passed his bills on old-
new symbols, "If we agree... that we should not use the symbols of past epochs, 
including the Soviet epoch, we will have to agree that our mothers and fathers 
have lived a useless, senseless life, that they have lived their lives in vain." 
(FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE, 5 Dec 00; via Lexis-Nexis) Statements of this kind 
ought to be considered in any analysis of what makes Putin tick and where he is 
leading his country. 
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Russian Federation: Security Services 
By Scott Fleeher 
 
Pasko is out...will Babkin remain in?  
Not long after some degree of closure was achieved in the case of Grigory 
Pasko, accused of espionage, another high-visibility spy saga assumed center 
stage of the Russian media and the judiciary. Just days following Pasko's 23 
January release, the re-investigation of the 73-year-old Russian 
scientist/professor Anatoly Babkin became public.  
 
The Babkin case has been enveloped in the miasmatic shroud engulfing the 
security services (along with their enthusiastic colleagues at the justice ministry). 
Unfounded accusations, lengthy prison sentences, and charges ranging from 
neglect to torture are just a few of the allegations regularly leveled at the two 
agencies. Such public attention presumably is likely to be all the more 
unwelcome in light of recent calls by President Putin encouraging "respect for 
human rights" and "humanitarian treatment." Anatoly Babkin's professions of 
innocence and claims that he was forced (by the FSB) to confess to treason 
under duress (ASSOCIATED PRESS, 12 Feb 03; via Lexis-Nexis) are 
disconcerting for the FSB, the judiciary, and the president. 
 
Babkin's rapid metamorphosis from respected scientist and esteemed professor 
(at the Bauman Technical University in Moscow) to enemy of the state began 
with his arrest in April of 2000. He is charged with treason, a charge that can lead 
to a prison sentence of between 12 and 20 years. (INTERFAX, 1611 GMT, 4 Feb 
03; FBIS-SOV-2003-0204, via World News Connection) This accusation stems 
from an FSB allegation that Babkin compiled and smuggled technical data 
involving the Shkval (Squall) missile system into the United States through 
Edmond Pope, who was accused of espionage (and later pardoned). 
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According to Babkin's defense attorney, the entire data collected and 
subsequently passed on to the University of Pennsylvania were part of an 
agreement between Bauman University and its American counterpart. 
(INTERFAX, 1611 GMT, 4 Feb 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-0204, via World News 
Connection) The defense maintains that data transferred to the University of 
Pennsylvania were exchanged under the authority of a "special commission of 
the Moscow University," a claim which, once substantiated, should exonerate 
Babkin. (KOMMERSANT, 12 Feb 03; via Lexis-Nexis) The court did not allow a 
similar defense to succeed during Pope's trial, however. 
 
There is the possibility that the material in question may have been so-called 
"dual-use technology." It appears that the scientific data at the heart of the 
indictment may not be limited to the advanced high-speed underwater missile 
known as the Squall, (AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, 11 Feb 03; via Lexis-Nexis) 
but in reality may also be applied to routine civilian applications such as fire 
fighting. (KOMMERSANT, 12 Feb 03; via Lexis-Nexis) This may pose a 
quandary for the presidential "apparat," in light of the recent loosening of 
restrictions involving a number of dual-use technologies. With symptoms of 
Spymania appearing ever more frequently in the headlines, and distrust running 
rampant through the Russian scientific community, evidence that would fully 
exonerate Babkin and prove that the data in question involved dual-use 
technology would hardly be welcome. 
 
On 19 February, the Moscow Municipal Court found Babkin guilty of espionage 
and gave him a suspended sentence of eight years in prison. (THE MOSCOW 
TIMES, 20 Feb 03; via Lexis-Nexis) The chief prosecutor had requested that the 
court take into account the defendant's failing health. (AGENCE FRANCE-
PRESSE, 11 Feb 03; via Lexis-Nexis) 
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Russian Federation: Domestic Issues and Legislative 
Branch 
By Kate Martin 
 
POLITICAL PARTIES 
Parties go out on a limb as branches face scrutiny  
Although nearly a year still remains before parliamentary elections in December, 
Russia's political parties already are facing several challenges, from within and 
without, concerning their very existence - due to schisms and government 
investigations, as well as fluctuating popularity with the voters. 
 
Not surprisingly, politicians are getting mixed messages. Government 
representatives may turn a blind eye to severely inflated membership totals; 
indeed, some parties reportedly keep a second and sometimes a third set of 
books with vastly divergent numbers - one for public consumption, via the media; 
one for the justice ministry; and one for internal use - without sparking an official 
examination. (RFE/RL NEWSLINE, 14 Jan 03) However, some lies are better 
than others. Party leaders apparently can fool the public about their level of 
support, but they have been warned that the justice ministry will be checking 
registration information. In particular, an official at the Central Election Board 
admonished party leaders to take the ministry's check on regional branches very 
seriously. "If the Justice Ministry finds that the data [are] fictitious, registrations of 
some of their branches may be revoked," Yelena Dubrovina said. (ITAR-TASS, 
1824 GMT, 25 Jan 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-0125, via World News Connection) Since 
parties seeking seats in the Duma are required to have branches in at least half 
of Russia's constituent territories, the loss of branches due to ministry 
investigations could result in loss of eligibility for appearing on the ballot. Minster 
of Justice Yuri Chaika reported that 50 parties already have been registered, with 
29 of the 50 having submitted proof of the required number of branches. 
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At least one newspaper is looking at the justice ministry's activities with a 
jaundiced eye. Vremya MN claimed that centrist parties, not oppositional groups, 
should be wary of investigation: "An overabundance of allies worries the 
government more than the existence of political opponents." (VREMYA MN, 30 
Jan 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-0130, via World News Connection)  
 
In the meantime, a number of parties have begun to align themselves into blocs 
in attempts to ensure crossing over the five-percent hurdle for party list 
representation in 225 seats of the Duma. (The other 225 seats represent single-
member constituencies.) The Russian Party of Workers' Self-Government 
announced that it will join with (ex-Communist) Gennady Seleznev's Revival of 
Russia party once the election campaign begins. (ITAR-TASS, 1641 GMT, 25 
Jan 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-0125, via World News Connection) Liberal Russia Co-
chairman Sergei Yushenkov subsequently called for "democratic" parties to 
create a single party list. Mikhail Prusak, governor of Novgorod and leader of the 
Democratic Party of Russia, expressed support for the idea, which he said would 
be discussed in March at the Congress of Democratic Forces. (RFE/RL 
NEWSLINE, 10 Feb 03) 
 
The two parties most assured of seats, Unity Party and the Communist Party 
(KPRF), continue to do well in polls; a recent survey indicated that the former 
would have received 26 percent of the vote, while the latter would have received 
24 percent of the vote, if elections had been held at the beginning of January. 
(ITAR-TASS, 1902 GMT, 30 Jan 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-0130, via World News 
Connection) The Unity Party's results, moreover, indicated a slight rise in its 
popularity, which had been on par with the Communist Party in December. 
 
Given their vastly different platforms, it is unlikely that the increase in Unity's 
popularity is a result of KPRF supporters jumping ship. However, the Communist 
Party has been weathering several storms recently which could be affecting its 
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popularity. Seleznev's departure, in response to attempts to remove him from the 
Duma speaker position, split the party significantly. Subsequently, curious 
allegations surfaced of secret backers of the party - straining the "politics make 
strange bedfellows" adage beyond all credibility -- while party leader Gennady 
Zyuganov strenuously denied that funding was forthcoming from self-exiled 
tycoon Boris Berezovsky or from the YUKOS oil company. And, although he had 
publicly castigated Gennady Semigin, chairman of the Executive Committee of 
the People's Patriotic Union of Russia (of which the Communist Party constitutes 
a significant component), Zyuganov denied that the conflict between them would 
weaken further the KPRF. "All the tales that one or two people can influence the 
party's power are conjectures," Zyuganov said. The conflict with Semigin, he 
added, was "a new attempt to split our organization." (ITAR-TASS, 1831 GMT, 
30 Jan 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-0130, via World News Connection) 
 
Such schisms may be the least of the problems facing the KPRF. Nezavisimaya 
gazeta, which is owned by Berezovsky, reached the bound-to-be-unnerving 
conclusion that the party should expect little media coverage as the elections 
approach, if the near-total lack of attention garned by Zyuganov's recent press 
conference is any indication. No coverage was seen on ORT, REN-TV or NTV; 
RTR quoted the party leader only minimally. Indeed, the only media outlet that 
provided substantive coverage was TV-Tsentr. (RFE/RL NEWSLINE, 4 Feb 03) 
 
LEGISLATURE  
Deputies say language law amendments are #@!%*#  
On 5 February, the Duma passed the bill establishing Russian as the state 
language, mandating its use in all public areas. Two hundred and forty-eight MPs 
passed the bill, which bans the public use of invectives referring to citizens' race, 
nationality, occupation, social status, gender, language, religion or political 
convictions, as well as the use of foreign words and phrases if a Russian version 
exists. Interestingly enough, the bill also prohibits the use of obscenities in print 
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and electronic media. (ITAR-TASS, 1653 GMT, 5 Feb 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-0205, 
via World News Connection)  
 
The ban on obscenities could have been problematic for journalists covering 
Duma proceedings two days later when some MPs tried to oust Vladimir 
Zhirinovsky on the grounds that he overstepped his authority by writing a 
controversial letter to US President George W. Bush concerning Iraq. Deputy 
Aleksandr Fedulov's strident defense of Zhirinovsky degenerated into a rant 
against Gennady Zyuganov and Gennady Seleznev, and then against the 
political niceties necessary for civil discourse. His obscenities-laced speech 
sparked the ire of a fellow MP, Vasily Shandybin from Bryansk, who walked up to 
Fedulov and grabbed the deputy by the lapels. Blows were exchanged before the 
deputies were separated. While Fedulov was punished for his use of profanities, 
Zhirinovsky defended his word choice. "The people speak this way, and we are 
representatives of the people," he explained. (ROSSIYKAYA GAZETA, 8 Feb 03; 
FBIS-SOV-2003-0208, via World News Connection) Fortunately for the MPs, the 
recently passed language law had not been promulgated.  
 
Moreover, it will not be promulgated in its present form, the Federation Council 
subsequently decided. After two Federation Council committees recommended a 
review by a conciliatory commission, the full council rejected the Duma-approved 
draft. Council Speaker Sergei Mironov reportedly said the law was "half-baked" 
and contained many flaws. (ITAR-TASS, 1005 GMT, 12 Feb 03; FBIS-SOV-
2003-0212, via World News Connection) The vote -- 126 against, 7 in favor, with 
10 abstentions - indicated the council members' disregard for two significant 
portions of the bill: the ban on foreign words and phrases, and the prohibition of 
the public use of "non-standard speech." (INTERFAX, 1041 GMT, 12 Feb 03; 
FBIS-SOV-2003-0212, via World News Connection) 
 
MEDIA 
NTV saga continues 
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Fallout from the ouster of Boris Jordan from his positions as head of NTV and 
general director of the Gazprom-Media board continues to spread. Last month 
NTV's Executive Board voted unanimously to express no confidence in the 
station's new director, Nikolai Senkevich, following his appointment of Aleksei 
Zemsky as first deputy director. Popular NTV host Leonid Parfenov explained 
that the board's concern centered on Zemsky's background as a producer of 
programs that focus more on entertainment than on news dissemination. "How 
this person can direct an information service is not understandable. The first 
deputy for broadcasting at NTV is first of all an information-service director," 
Parfenov told Vremya Novostei. "[E]ither [the staff] or the management has to 
leave" following such vote of no confidence, NTV Editor-in-Chief Tatiana Mitkova 
told Interfax. (RFE/RL NEWSLINE, 31 Jan 03) 
 
In the face of such statements, the NTV leadership made it quite clear that, while 
the pen is mightier than the sword, the press release is mightier than the pen - 
especially when the pen is wielded by journalists. "The heads of the NTV open 
joint-stock company wish to say that there is no such element as a board in the 
composition of NTV. The shareholders, the council of directors and the television 
company's general director are its official bodies," an official statement read. 
"Resolutions and decisions by other parties speaking on behalf of NTV have no 
legal force." (INTERFAX, 1722 GMT, 30 Jan 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-0130, via 
World News Connection) Newly named Gazprom-Media head Alexander Dybal 
suggested that Gazprom Director Alexei Miller should dismiss every member of 
the non-existent board except for the most popular journalists -- Mitkova, 
Parfenov and Savik Shuster. Dybal added, however, that he wanted to prevent 
an exodus of journalists from NTV. (INTERFAX, 0852 GMT, 5 Feb 03; FBIS-
SOV-2003-0205, via World News Connection) 
 
In any event, Mitkova did not appear as the anchor of the evening news following 
the vote of no confidence. And Parfenov did leave, although that departure may 
be temporary. He reportedly asserted that "it is impossible to produce the 
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program in these circumstances," and took an open-ended creative leave. 
(ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA, 8 Feb 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-0208, via World News 
Connection) While still employed by NTV, he has received offers from the STS 
TV channel, which served as sanctuary for Yevgeni Kiselev two years ago when 
he left NTV. Parfenov was not the only person walking away from the channel. 
NTV deputy director Rafael Akopov resigned on 10 February. The channel's 
spokesperson did not provide further information about his departure. 
(INTERFAX, 1601 GMT, 10 Feb 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-0210, via World News 
Connection) 
 
Boris Nemtsov, leader of the parliamentary faction Union of Right Forces, 
summed up the mess succinctly: The "clumsy reshuffling in the staff is destroying 
this talented TV station not by the day but by the very hour." (INTERFAX, 1933 
GMT 30 Jan 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-0130, via World News Connection) 
 
 
Russian Federation: Foreign Relations 
By Ansel Stein 
 
The Moscow-Paris-Berlin pseudo-alliance  
Much has been made in the last weeks of the Russo-French-German "alliance" 
that opposes the United States' position vis-à-vis Iraq. The coordination of these 
three powers reached its apex in the wake of Hans Blix's most recent report to 
the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). President Putin visited Berlin and 
Paris last week, prior to Blix's report, and declared (as has become fairly 
standard) that the strategic interests of each of the countries were aligned in 
perfect harmony. Russia's actions elsewhere, however, demonstrate differences 
between Russian, French and German foreign policies, with the exception of 
their opposition to American "hegemony." In fact, the recent Russo-Pakistani 
summit once again indicates Moscow's willingness to play both sides of the 
fence, given the situation. 
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The UN sanctions regime  
Russian policy has been most visible in the context of the UNSC. President Putin 
joined Germany and China in backing a French proposal to expand weapons 
inspections so as to prevent the forcible disarmament of Iraq. The Russian 
foreign ministry subsequently announced that it planned to issue an official 
analysis (which, no doubt, will be less than favorable) of the evidence against 
Iraq that Secretary Powell presented to the UNSC. That analysis probably is 
intended to buttress Putin's stance that, while arms inspectors should review US 
accusations, he saw nothing to justify the use of force. (THE NEW YORK TIMES, 
13 Feb 03; via Lexis-Nexis) 
 
Despite some Western analyses that view Russia as merely trailing behind 
France, there is evidence of Russian initiatives to counter American policy. For 
example, the Russian Ambassador to Iraq, Vladimir Titorenko, announced on 6 
February that Iraq and Russia will sign contracts in the areas of energy, 
transport, communications and agriculture worth around $200 million. 
(INTERFAX, 1729 GMT, 6 Feb 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-0206, via World News 
Connection) A day earlier, Atomic Energy Minister Aleksandr Rumyantsev had 
refused to rule out future cooperation in the nuclear sphere with Iraq. Quite the 
opposite, in fact. "If the sanctions are lifted, and Iraq shows an interest in creating 
nuclear technologies, then yes," Rumyantsev said in an interview with Vremya 
Novostei. (INTERFAX, 0947 GMT, 5 Feb 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-0205, via World 
News Connection) On 10 February, the "after-sanctions-are-lifted" track led Iraq 
to announce the cancellation of LUKoil's contract to develop the West Qurna-2 
oilfield. Iraq's acting oil minister, Samir al-Najm, claimed at the time that "LUKoil 
has fulfilled not a single commitment, in particular, not a single dollar has been 
invested in the contract over the past three years." (INTERFAX, 1227 GMT, 10 
Feb 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-0210, via World News Connection) One of Russia's 
motivations in its Iraq policy is to remove the sanctions regime and to exploit the 
economic opportunities that surely would ensue. If this happens, France and 
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Germany may become competitors rather than continue their alliance. (Indeed, 
French and German companies generally have been willing to sell to Saddam 
Hussein's regime.) 
 
"New" vs. "Old" NATO/EU/Europe  
Vitaliy Tretyakov argued last week that the Russo-French-German alliance 
marked the beginning of Russia's integration into Europe and that this would lead 
to its entry into the EU by 2010. (ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA, 13 Feb 03; FBIS-
WEU-2003-0213, via World News Connection) In his interview with France's 
Channel 3 two weeks ago, President Putin gave this prediction a bizarre basis 
when he claimed that the roots of the culture shared by Russia and France "are 
in the culture of Ancient Rome, Ancient Greece and Byzantium. That is what 
forms the basis of a future greater Europe." (ITAR-TASS, 1804 GMT, 9 Feb 03; 
FBIS-SOV-2003-0209, via World News Connection) One should note that these 
"roots" are shared also by the United States, Muslim civilizations (Muslims 
transmitted the attainments of ancient Greece to Renaissance Europe), India via 
Alexander the Great's empire, etc. Just think: Russia in the EU by 2010, and the 
sky is the limit by 2015. 
 
The agreement of policy between Russia, France and Germany is not about 
culture. It concerns, in Putin's own words, countering American "hegemony." "We 
believe here, in Russia, just as French President Jacques Chirac believes, that 
the future international security architecture must be based on a multi-polar 
world. This is the main thing that unites us." (ITAR-TASS, 1804 GMT, 9 Feb 03; 
FBIS-SOV-2003-0209, via World News Connection) The problem is that Russia 
is pursuing this notion to the eventual detriment of its own security and that of 
many other countries.  
 
Russian media coverage of the Aero India-2003 expo, which began last week in 
Bangalore, pointed out: "We sell India more advanced weapons than those the 
Russian Army has. And this is Right!" The process of selling India arms that 
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supposedly are superior to weapons supplied to Russia's own armed forces is 
being linked in Moscow to the fight against a "unipolar" world. "Indian Air Force 
Su-30KI's will participate in the show. This is the best fourth+ generation fighter 
in the world, and even the Russian Army does not have any of them... . Are we 
doing the right thing in sending our best abroad? Of course... . First, it meets 
Russia's geopolitical interests. A strong India is a vital factor in regional stability 
and this completely fits in the doctrine of a multipolar world, which Russia holds 
to. Secondly, it develops our... technologies and production lines. New 
developments which are already rolled out and finished will sooner or later come 
to the Russian Army." (VREMYA MN, 7 Feb 03; FBIS-NES-2003-0207, via World 
News Connection) The success of the "sooner or later" policy is, of course, on 
full display in Chechnya (whose guerrilla chief Basaev previously, as a member 
of the GRU, had helped Moscow to tear away Abkhazia from Georgia). 
 
Sitting on both sides of the fence  
Moscow demonstrated its willingness to play both sides of the fence at the recent 
Russo-Pakistani summit. As recently as December, Putin declared absolute 
strategic coordination with India, Pakistan's chief adversary. During the summit, 
however, Russia announced its intention to put aside past disputes and focus on 
cooperation with Pakistan in a number of fields, including "in the energy, metal 
and telecommunications industries, in the aerospace sector, and in developing 
and implementing a number of infrastructure projects." (INTERFAX, 2104 GMT, 4 
Feb 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-0204, Via World News Connection) Perhaps the 
Russians are telling the Indians that all is fair in the pursuit of a "multipolar" 
world. 
 
The survivability of the Paris-Berlin-Moscow troika is highly questionable. 
Germany's (temporary) moralist-pacifist posture, France's leadership illusion, and 
Russia's "we're still a player" stance may be hard to align in the future. 
 
 
 16 
Russian Federation: Armed Forces 
By Steve Kwast and Dan Rozelle 
 
Russia continues to bully Georgia with military troops and weapons  
If any leader of the former Soviet republics thought the collapse of the USSR 
meant freedom from occupation, he would be sadly mistaken. Russia has 
continued to maintain significant military troops, garrisons, ammunition storage 
facilities and peacekeeping forces in most of the ex-Soviet states. Moscow uses 
this military presence to enmesh itself in the geopolitical landscape of each 
region in a desperate attempt to maintain some relevancy. The recent string of 
events in Georgia's northern provinces illustrates this phenomenon. 
 
Even before the United Nations inappropriately undermined Georgian authority 
and sovereignty by voting to extend peacekeeping forces in Abkhazia, (THE NIS 
OBSERVED, 5 Feb 03) Moscow was bullying Tbilisi with words and actions. Two 
weeks before the UN voted, the chairman of the Russian Duma defense 
committee, Andrei Nikolaev, met with the speaker of the Georgian parliament, 
Nino Burdzhanadze. At that meeting Nikolaev made Russia's stand very clear: 
"The UN monitors will leave the republic if Georgia refuses to extend the 
mandate of the peacekeeping contingent. This would be fraught with danger of a 
new war, and would aggravate the situation in the region," Nikolaev said. (ITAR-
TASS, 1240 GMT, 22 Jan 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-0122, via World News 
Connection) In addition to this barely veiled threat, Russia has undermined 
Georgian sovereignty by issuing Russian passports to over 80 percent of the 
Abkhaz population, supporting the ruble as the area's main hard currency and 
restoring railroad communication between Sochi and Sukhumi. All these actions 
border on annexation of Georgian territory by Russia. Georgian President Eduard 
Shevardnadze is furious but helpless. He cannot force Russia to withdraw its 
troops. (VREMYA MN, 1400 GMT, 5 Feb 03; WPS Defense and Security, via ISI 
Emerging Markets Database) 
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Between threats of military action, Russian President Putin keeps pretending to 
take the high road. "Russia will not insist on the peacekeepers remaining in 
Georgia if Tbilisi demands their withdrawal," he said. (RFE/RL NEWSLINE, 30 
Jan 03) 
 
On 3 February, President Shevardnadze proposed the replacement of the 
Russian peacekeeping force currently deployed in the Abkhaz conflict zone. He 
suggested that the force should be modeled on one currently deployed in the 
unrecognized Republic of South Ossetia, which comprises Russian, Georgian 
and Ossetian service personnel. He went on to suggest that the EU might send 
troops from its rapid-reaction force and that Azeri troops serve in such an EU 
force. (RFE/RL NEWSLINE, 4 Feb 03) In the end, Shevardnadze would prefer 
any force but a Russian force that undermines his authority at every turn. On 6 
February, he went so far as to announce that Ukraine and Uzbekistan are ready 
to take part in peacekeeping operations in Abkhazia. "Russian peacekeepers fail 
to cope with their duties and, regrettably, the UN Security Council does not pay 
enough attention to this circumstance," he said. Neither the meeting of the 
Georgian and Russian presidents nor the UN Security Council resolution has 
increased clarity regarding the presence and the mandate of the Russian 
peacekeepers in Abkhazia. (WWW.CIVIL.GE, 6 Feb 03) Shevardnadze has very 
good reason to be frustrated. Russia has maneuvered him into a corner in 
Abkhazia and has acted against his wishes with military presence elsewhere in 
his country as well.  
 
For example, Russian troops are still garrisoned in Georgia. Shevardnadze has 
been trying to get them out since the fall of the Soviet Union, but true to form, 
Moscow has not budged. President Putin talks about wanting to withdraw the 
troops. He even has allowed "serious" negotiations and timetables for 
withdrawal, but in the end the troops never leave. In the opinion of Nino 
Burdzhanadze, the Georgian parliament speaker, the issue of Russian military 
bases in Georgia "is the main irritant in relations between the two countries." 
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"Russia has closed down only one out of its four bases in Georgia," 
Burdzhanadze noted. "In the opinion of Tbilisi, they could be closed down within 
the next three years, and not within the Moscow-suggested timeframe of fourteen 
years." (VREMYA MN, 1400 GMT, 5 Feb 03; WPS Defense and Security, via ISI 
Emerging Markets Database) 
 
To add insult to injury, Russia is sending weapons into South Ossetia. On 3 
February, the Georgian foreign ministry accused Russia of deploying arms and 
military vehicles in excess of what Russia is permitted to have in the Caucasus 
under the revised version of the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE). 
Georgian media reported that Russia has provided South Ossetia with 19 tanks, 
20 armored personnel carriers, several dozen grenade launchers, and a large 
number of submachine guns. (RUSTAVI-2 TV, 1400 GMT, 9 Feb 03; BBC 
Monitoring, via ISI Emerging Markets Database) Moscow's response continued 
to follow the pattern of intimidation and denial with which Georgia has been 
dealing for over a decade. Colonel General Nikolay Kormiltsev, commander-in-
chief of the Russian Ground Forces and deputy defense minister, said, "there is 
not a single piece of military hardware in the zone of the South Ossetian conflict, 
which is under the control of the Russian peacekeepers in accordance with a 
resolution adopted by the heads of the CIS member states." (ITAR-TASS, 0748 
GMT, 4 Feb 03; BBC Monitoring, via ISI Emerging Markets Database) This is a 
classic Russian denial. The Russian peacekeeping troops may have signed the 
weapons and equipment over to local troops to avoid a "technical" violation of the 
CFE. In any case, the type and number of weapons in Tskhinvali, the capital of 
the self-styled South Ossetian republic, conclusively prove they came directly 
from Russia. Vakhtang Rcheulishvili, the Georgian president's personal envoy for 
the Ossetian conflict, told Civil Georgia press on 4 February that "there is no 
other way to bring such weapons to Ossetia [than from Russia]." 
(WWW.CIVIL.GE, 5 Feb 03) 
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Moscow's pattern of intimidation and military presence in Georgia holds true for 
many ex-Soviet states. It doesn't matter if the troops garrisoned in these states 
are well trained or well supplied. Their purpose is not so much military as it is 
political. As with Georgia, Moscow uses these troops to keep its fingers in the 
business of these states in hopes of maintaining influence and control. 
 
It would be wise for the international community and the UN to stop looking the 
other way and start demanding that the Russians stay out of sovereign countries 
such as Georgia where they are not welcome. The precedents that have become 
habit now can only serve to destabilize a region of the world in desperate need of 
stability and genuine sovereignty. 
 
Russia's conscription dilemma  
Talk in some (admittedly small) political circles in Washington, DC, lately has 
centered on whether the United States should reinstate the draft. Perhaps those 
individuals doing the talking should invite representatives from Russia to share 
their knowledge of conscription's effects on a society and of a resulting military 
not wholly engaged in full-scale conflict. 
 
For more than a decade, Russia has struggled to reshape its military into a more 
modern and effective fighting force. Few Russians dispute the present poor 
condition of its armed forces. Having inherited a force of 2.8 million from the 
Soviet Army, Russia now has approximately 1.1 million soldiers, sailors and 
airmen in its main armed forces, not including those in other agencies such as 
the border guards, the interior ministry and the railways. (THE NEW YORK 
TIMES, 18 Dec 02; via Lexis-Nexis) Much of the decrease is due, obviously, to 
forces lost to countries that became independent in 1991. 
 
At its current size, Russia's military is only slightly smaller than that of the US. 
However, while its size has decreased, the same cannot be said for the 
magnitude of problems its leadership faces. A large proportion is directly 
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attributable to personnel: crime, drug abuse and desertion. Not surprisingly, 
many Russians now perceive that part of the solution lies in a volunteer military. 
They may be right. The unpopularity of conscription within Russia is becoming 
increasingly evident.  
 
Russia's military is an overwhelmingly conscripted force; nearly 600,000 draftees 
serve a two-year enlistment. With an eligible age range from 18 to 28, it is almost 
impossible to avoid being called. However, the draft is so unpopular and feared 
that nearly 90 percent of eligible men evade it, relying on medical or education 
deferments. Even those without the option of deferment try to avoid service. 
According to Lieutenant General Vasiliy Smirnov, head of the General Staff's 
Main Organization and Mobilization Directorate, approximately 30,000 men 
dodged military service during the spring 2002 conscription period. In the fall of 
2002 when 174,000 men were conscripted, another 21,000 avoided the call-up. 
(ITAR-TASS, 1245 GMT, 16 Jan 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-0116, via World News 
Connection) 
 
Bribery is perhaps the one tried-and-true method for avoiding military service. It 
is well known that "price lists" exist for the assistance of officials in avoiding 
military service. (ZOLOTOY ROG, 31 Oct 02; What the Papers Say, via ISI 
Defense and Security Database) By one estimate, bribes to military district 
commissariat representatives amount to nearly $50 million a year. (THE NEW 
YORK TIMES, 18 Dec 02; via Lexis-Nexis) In fact, bribery is so rampant that only 
the poorest and most alienated sections of society seem to be drafted. Nearly 
20% are high school dropouts; 7% have prison records. (VREMYA MN, 30 Aug 
02; What the Papers Say, via ISI Defense and Security Database) Close to 33% 
of all potential recruits are found only partially fit for military duty because of 
health problems, and the rate at which drug abusers are conscripted is putatively 
over 20%. (THE NIS OBSERVED, 5 Feb 03)  
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While bribery is the surest way, other methods also exist to circumvent the 
military's quest for manpower. Thousands of conscription-age men are exploiting 
a legal loophole that allows them to avoid mandatory military service, opting 
instead to volunteer for service with the interior, emergencies or justice ministries 
by signing up for two-year stints as firefighters or policemen. The number of men 
doing so grew from 1,051 in 1999 to 7,234 in 2001, despite defense ministry 
assertions that the armed forces are supposed to get first pick of available 
conscripts. (THE MOSCOW TIMES, 28 Jan 03; via Lexis-Nexis)  
 
The military, of course, would like to close this loophole. Defense Minister Sergei 
Ivanov has notified President Putin that the actions of the interior and 
emergencies ministries conflict with federal law. But the shortage of manpower 
faced by these ministries makes it likely they will ignore any attempts to change 
the situation. (NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, 27 Jan 03; What the Papers Say, via 
ISI Defense and Security Database)  
 
Another less subtle legal maneuver exists for those who find their name on the 
military commissariat's list of conscripts. Human rights activists are helping these 
men challenge the decisions of the commissariat in court. While the trial is 
underway, the potential conscript cannot be drafted. By the time the verdict is 
announced, the conscription period may have ended. (GAZETA, 21 Nov 02; 
What the Papers Say, via ISI Defense and Security Database) 
 
However, the most visible means of avoiding military service of late is simply to 
desert. Large groups of conscripts have left their units after being subjected to 
the brutal treatment often present in the military barracks. (THE NIS 
OBSERVED, 5 Feb 03) The hazing, bullying and nearly inhumane living 
conditions that exist are clearly the root of the resistance to mandatory military 
service. Boris Nemtsov, the leader of the Union of Right Forces, claims that 531 
military members have been killed and another 20,000 injured as a result of 
bullying or hazing. (NTV MIR, 1630 GMT, 20 Dec 02; BBC Monitoring, via ISI 
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Defense and Security Database) The military refers to similar figures, while the 
Union of Committees of Soldiers' Mothers, a human rights organization, offers a 
much higher number of 4,000 deaths -- but those figures include all non-combat 
causes of death. 
 
Regardless of the growing resistance to conscription, it is doubtful that Russia 
will end the practice any time soon. Even while pushing for contract or volunteer 
service, such as the 76th Airborne Division experiment, President Putin 
continues to advocate conscription. During a speech at the Ryazan Paratroopers 
School, Putin stated that, despite reforms, the conscription system will be 
retained indefinitely. This obviously sits well with the military. Despite the rising 
number of grossly unqualified recruits, military leaders insist that reforms must 
focus on the structures of the armed forces as well as new weapons and 
equipment. Left unsaid is a clear desire to retain the bloated Soviet military 
model with an enemy in the west. Even if President Putin were to achieve his 
goal of reforming the military and refocusing Russia's national security concept to 
oppose "terrorism," the General Staff undoubtedly would find a way to prove that 
"terrorism" can only be fought with millions of military personnel. 
(YEZHENEDELNYI ZHURNAL, 10 Dec 02; What the Papers Say, via ISI 
Russian Political Monitor Database) 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Western Region 
By Nadezda Kinsky 
 
UKRAINE 
Preparing the ground  
On a recent visit to Washington, Our Ukraine's Viktor Yushchenko made an 
appeal that the Ukrainian population not be forgotten when funding cuts to punish 
the Kuchma regime are undertaken. US policy was in line with that call; at the 
end of January the Bush Administration decided to divert funds originally 
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intended for the Ukrainian government to non-governmental organizations. The 
funding cuts for Ukraine come as a result of the Kolchuga scandal which still has 
not been resolved to Washington's satisfaction. The diversion of the funds to 
NGOs, US State Department spokesman Louis Fintour said, "reaffirms that 
support for a stable democratic market-oriented Ukraine -- increasingly integrated 
into Euro-Atlantic institutions -- remains in the US interest." (RFE/RL NEWSLINE, 
3 Feb 03) 
 
Viktor Yushchenko is the most popular figure of the Ukrainian opposition, and 
also the most pro-Western personality with his Our Ukraine party. His recent visit 
to the United States serves as contrast to President Kuchma's recent flirtation 
with Russia. Despite Kuchma's repeated statements about his intention to follow 
a pro-Western route in his foreign policy, his recent appointment as president of 
the CIS and celebrations of Russo-Ukrainian friendship jar with his moves 
towards European or NATO integration. These issues of foreign policy, however, 
are most meaningful in their domestic context -- the run-up to the 2004 
presidential election. To Kuchma, the guarantee of some support after the 
election is absolutely vital. If he were to lose his position, he also would lose his 
presidential immunity, and thus become vulnerable to prosecution -- not only on 
corruption charges, unpleasant enough as they are, but on charges of murder 
concerning the yet-unsolved death of journalist Georgiy Gongadze.  
 
There are other seemingly politically-motivated deaths for which he might be held 
responsible -- and they seem to be on the rise again in recent months. After 
several disappearances of journalists, another car accident on icy roads is 
arousing suspicion. Anatoliy Yermak, an opposition parliamentary deputy and 
one of the foremost fighters against corruption and mafia organizations, was 
killed in an 11 February crash. The interior ministry immediately opened an 
investigation, but its quick reference to dangerous road conditions seemed a little 
too handy -- whether because the idea of an opposition figure dying in a car 
crash is so familiar and bound to arouse suspicion or because a guilty hand may 
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be involved. No doubt, the investigation will remain open and contested for a 
while to come.  
 
Given the situation in Kuchma's Ukraine and his personal record of corruption 
and worse, it is evident that he needs to build for himself a reliable structure 
within which he can safely enter his life as an ex-president. His new CIS 
presidency will provide some legal and financial assurance. Even more 
reassuring would be the protection from Russia which he may hope to be 
enjoying if he can ensure being succeeded by a pro-Russian candidate -- though 
at the same time, to turn away from the West completely is economically and 
politically unviable even for Kuchma. 
 
BELARUS 
New start 
German Ambassador Eberhard Heyken arrived on 9 February as head of the 
Minsk OSCE mission amid rumors that the mission's hands were severely tied by 
the agreement with Belarus that had opened the way for the OSCE's return.  
 
His arrival was immediately preceded by an assessment of Belarus by the OSCE 
Parliamentary Assembly's Working Group on Belarus. Its chairwoman, Uta Zapf, 
noted on 7 February that there were "no sufficient grounds" for allowing Belarus 
to become a member of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, given its lack of 
progress on issues of media freedom, treatment of trade unions and local 
election campaigns. (RFE/RL NEWSLINE, 7 Feb 03) The working group's last 
assessment, in May 2002, on a lack of democratic progress in Belarus, 
contributed considerably to the break in relations between the OSCE and 
Belarus, and the eventual expulsion of the OSCE mission in Minsk. It now 
remains to be seen now whether Heyken and his team fare better than their 
predecessors, as the West continues to ostracize Belarus under Lukashenka. 
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Lukashenka initially spoke with restraint of the new mission. "I hope very much 
that we will not have conflicts like those with the OSCE Advisory and Monitoring 
Group led by [Hans Georg] Wieck." (RFE/RL NEWSLINE, 3 Feb 03) He also took 
a symbolic step back from his Russian ties, stating his concern about the 
Belarusian population's lack of enthusiasm for the proposed union with Russia. 
Lukashenka seems to remain intent on keeping the process of integration going 
rather than seeing an integration or alliance come to fruition, which may paint him 
into one corner.  
 
Heyken most recently served as the German ambassador to Ukraine (1996-
2000). The Minsk office's mandate is quite tame and does not address many 
important issues that have generated international concern -- most notably, the 
lack of any mention of human rights standards or the monitoring of press 
freedom. Members of the Belarusian opposition have been particularly critical of 
the new mission's potential. They have, however, voiced approval of the working 
group's findings on Lukashenka's Belarus. Belarusian Popular Front leader 
Vintsuk Vyachorka reportedly said he welcomed the decision since it confirmed 
Europe's opposition to the authoritarian regime of the Belarusian president. 
(RFE/RL NEWSLINE, 13 Feb 03) 
 
The OSCE Parliamentary Assembly's working group's decision as well as the 
beginning of a new OSCE mission can help Lukashenka to counterbalance 
Russian overtures during talks on the proposed union state, from which he 
appears to be backing away at the moment. With continued distancing of the 
West from Belarus, however, Lukashenka will be hard-pressed to find an 
alternative source of the economic and political support that he and his country 
need.  
 
 
Newly Independent States: Caucasus 
By Miriam Lanskoy 
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Who appointed Maigov? 
On 12 February Salambek Maigov announced that he had been appointed by 
Chechen President Aslan Maskhadov to be his representative to Russia. Maigov 
is a long-term resident of Moscow, where he heads the Anti-War Congress. 
(EKHO MOSKYY, 13 Feb 03; via echo.msk.ru) There remain some doubts about 
the authenticity of the appointment which, according to Maigov, was 
communicated to him by a fax on 3 February, but has not been announced on 
the Chechen government website Chechenpress or confirmed by any of 
Maskhadov's other representatives. Maigov says that he does not replace 
Akhmad Zakaev, who remains Maskhadov's representative in Europe and is 
currently undergoing extradition hearings in London. Rather, Maigov apparently 
replaces Mairbek Vyachagaev, who had been Maskhadov's Moscow 
representative but has relocated to France. 
 
When asked about his current occupation, Maigov told Ekho Moskvy that he is a 
"businessman" and a political activist. Maigov, who holds a Ph.D. from the 
prestigious Institute of International Economics and International Affairs 
(IMEiMO) -- once headed by the KGB's Yevgeni Primakov -- has many diverse 
political connections which place him squarely within the Moscow political elite. 
Citing an unnamed "veteran military analyst," RFE/RL reported that Maigov is a 
"former Military Intelligence (GRU) officer." (RFE/RL NEWSLINE, 14 Feb 03) 
Fellow IMEiMO affiliates Primakov and Anton Surikov pursued careers in the 
Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) and GRU, respectively. Maigov, a political 
opponent of both Dzhokhar Dudaev and Aslan Maskhadov, did not fight in the 
first Chechen war and there are no warrants against him in Russia. In 1997 
Maigov ran unsuccessfuly for the Chechen presidency.  
 
Since the start of the present war he has headed the Anti-War Congress in 
Moscow and has consistently called for dialogue to end the war and drawn 
attention to the plight of civilians in Chechnya. (See, for instance, his 
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commentary, "The counter-terrorist operation has reached a dead-end," 
NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, 22 Sep 00) In this capacity he has shared the podium 
with such stalwarts of the democratic movements as Sergei Kovalev of Memorial, 
Lev Ponamarev of Za prava cheloveka, and Anna Politkovskaya of Novaya 
gazeta. At the same time, Maigov is a member of the executive committee of the 
Eurasia party, which is inspired by the neo-fascist theories of Aleksandr Dugin. 
The co-chairman of the Executive Committee of the Eurasia party is none other 
than Pavel Borodin, the former head of the Kremlin's Control Commission. In 
1999 Borodin was indicted in Switzerland in a massive corruption scandal that 
threatened to engulf Kremlin insider Boris Berezovsky, Yel'tsin's daughter 
Tatyana Dyachenko and other members of the presidential administration. In 
1996, in his first Kremlin appointment, Vladimir Putin was Pavel Borodin's deputy.  
 
Why would a successful businessman with powerful contacts accept such a 
challenging and potentially dangerous appointment? Maigov says that his 
nomination was supported by "high-ranking Russian officials." (AGENCE 
FRANCE-PRESSE, 10 Feb 03; via Lexis-Nexis) In his interview with Ekho 
Moskvy, Maigov said that his appointment was negotiated over a three-month 
period and that Borodin had been fully informed. He also indicated that he would 
like to hold talks with representatives of Putin's administration and hinted that he 
has proposals from Maskhadov. Maigov refused to comment on whether 
Maskhadov remains committed to Chechnya's full independence. On the 
following day, Sergei Yastrzhembsky, Putin's chief spokesman on Chechen 
affairs, said that "I think one can talk to him [Maigov] as to a private individual, 
not as Maskhadov's representative." (TVS, 1200 GMT, 14 Feb 03; BBC 
Monitoring, via Lexis-Nexis)  
 
GEORGIA 
Shevardnadze bows to US pressure 
On 13 February Richard Boucher, the US State Department's spokesman, called 
on Georgia to extend Russia's peacekeeping mandate in Abkhazia: " The current 
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mandate of the Commonwealth of Independent States Peacekeeping Force in 
Abkhazia expired at the end of December, 2002. The United States supports 
extending the Force's mandate for another six-month period." 
(WWW.STATE.GOV) As reported in the 5 February issue of The NIS Observed, 
Georgia's National Security Council had identified three conditions under which it 
would extend the CIS mandate: Russia must stop granting passports to Abkhaz 
citizens; train traffic between Sochi and Sukhumi must cease; and the 
peacekeepers must assume responsibility for the Gali district. Boucher 
mentioned only one aspect of these criteria, "We fully understand the concern of 
the Georgian government about recent unilateral actions on Russia's part such 
as reopening the railway line from Sochi to Sukhumi. The United States believes 
that no one should engage in activities that would appear to enhance the 
separate status of Abkhazia and render the negotiating process more difficult." 
On 15 February, Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze bowed to the 
pressure, explaining, "The US and friendly countries are once again asking 
Georgia to extend the peacekeepers' mandate." (ITAR-TASS, 15 Feb 03; BBC 
Monitoring, via ISI Emerging Markets Database) 
 
A Russian scenario averted or imagined?  
In the summer of 1999, Russian President Boris Yel'tsin taught his CIS 
colleagues a lesson in how to leave office without relinquishing power. Yel'tsin 
struck a deal with his chekisty: He would elevate them to political power and, in 
return, they would guarantee immunity for him and his family. Several appointees 
of the old regime would remain in place to oversee the implementation of this 
deal. Many aspects of this model can be applied to Georgia and Azerbaijan, 
where aging presidents are nearing the end of their terms.  
 
The recent allegations that a "velvet coup" has been narrowly averted in Tbilisi 
suggests that such scenarios are being considered there. The story broke with 
an attack on an opposition candidate, David Gamkrelidze, the leader of the New 
Rights party. His office (located in the most central and tightly secured part of 
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Tbilisi) was ransacked by 20 -30 assailants in broad daylight who threatened 
Gamkrelidze at gunpoint on 3 February. Opposition political parties responded to 
this attack with a statement that "the attackers must have received at least tacit 
approval from the government" and a call for a swift investigation and trial of the 
assailants. (For an eyewitness account, see Irakly Areshidze "Attack On 
Opposition Party Offices Raises Instability Fears In Georgia," EURASIANET, 3 
Feb 03; via www.eurasianet.org) 
 
On the following day, Rustavi-2 television reported that several top officials, 
including State Minister Avtandil Jorbenadze and Interior Minister Koba 
Narchemashvili, had met informally with leaders of the pro-Shevardnadze party, 
Citizens Union Georgia, to plot a constitutional coup that would unseat President 
Shevardnadze in favor of Jorbenadze. (In the summer of 2002, Shevardnadze 
had endorsed Jorbenadze as a potential successor.) Opposition politicians, 
including Zurab Zhvania of United Democrats and Mikheil Saakashvili of the New 
National Movement, said they had heard about such preparations. For his part, 
Shevardnadze dismissed these rumors, saying that the procuracy would conduct 
its own investigation. (WWW.CIVIL.GE, 11 Feb 03) 
 
In a recent article on Civil Georgia, commentator Jaba Devdariani suggests that 
the rumors of a coup plot amount to a "storm in a teacup." If Zhvania and 
Saakashvili were aware of such a plan, how could Shevardnadze have failed to 
notice? Moreover, with a disapproval rating of over 65%, Jorbenadze is hardly a 
popular figure. Shevardnadze may have indicated a preference for Jorbenadze 
precisely so that he may absorb the energies of the opposition, reasons 
Devdariani. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Central Asia 
By David Montgomery 
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Central Asia and Iraq  
Central Asia is uneasy about the implications an American military action in Iraq 
might have on the stability of the region as a whole. Kazakh President Nursultan 
Nazarbaev has offered to negotiate with Iraq, while Kyrgyzstan continues to 
refuse the use of its air bases for any military effort against Iraq. The reasoning 
on both accounts appears to be largely influenced by oil contracts and the fear of 
increased regional instability, as well as by Russia's stance. 
 
The issue of instability  
Kyrgyzstan, which hosts the largest US military base in the region, not only has 
denied the US and allied forces permission to use Kyrgyz bases to launch 
operations against Iraq. (ITAR-TASS, 1552 GMT, 12 Feb 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-
0212, via World News Connection) Kyrgyz Foreign Minister Askar Aitmatov 
expressed Kyrgyzstan's support for the positions of Germany, France and Russia 
on the Iraq crisis. A possible motive behind this was reflected in a statement 
made by Aitmatov: "Kyrgyzstan, a neighbour of Afghanistan, is not interested in 
the weakening of the attention of the world community to the building of [the] 
post-conflict society in Afghanistan." (ITAR-TASS, 1418 GMT, 12 Feb 03; FBIS-
SOV-2003-0212, via World News Connection) 
 
Kyrgyzstan's concern may be genuine. There are fears that the new constitution 
may deepen the North-South division within the country (EURASIANET, 11 Feb 
03; via www.eurasianet.org) and that opposition claims of the recent referendum 
being rigged may contribute to instability. (INTERFAX, 1426 GMT, 6 Feb 03; 
FBIS-SOV-2003-0206, via World News Connection) Furthermore, the activities of 
Hizb-ut-Tahrir (HT) reportedly are growing in response to Kazakh, Kyrgyz, Tajik 
and Uzbek efforts to control religious expression. (EURASIANET, 8 Feb 03; via 
www.eurasianet.org)  
 
The issue of oil  
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In a 5 February joint press conference with Italian Prime Minister Silvio 
Berlusconi, Nazarbaev announced his willingness to help persuade Iraq to 
disarm and to mediate between Iraq and the US. (RFE/RL NEWSLINE, 7 Feb 
03) The following day, he met with Pope John Paul II to solicit support for the 
idea of holding a conference of leaders of the world's major religions in 
Kazakhstan. On 13 February, Nazarbaev hosted the Conference of Presidents of 
Major American Jewish Organizations in Almaty, following a conference of 
Central Asian Muslim leaders that had called for an international forum to 
promote inter-religious and inter-cultural dialogue. A statement from the 
participating leaders said that they "absolutely and unconditionally condemned 
terrorism in all its forms, irrespective of motivation." (HA'ARETZ, 14 Feb 03; via 
www.times.kg) 
 
Nazarbaev's efforts seem directly related to the fear that an American victory in 
Iraq could upset the oil market. Kazakhstan's economy is intimately linked to the 
development of oil and gas resources and there is a concern that a US-led ouster 
of Saddam Hussein could result in lifting restrictions on Iraq's oil exports. (It is 
worth noting that, with Hussein in power, France and Russia have the largest 
interests in the Iraqi energy sector and stand to gain the most should Iraq's 
relations with the world be normalized.) The fear is that lifting the limitations on 
Iraqi exports would lead to a drop in oil prices. And were global oil prices to drop, 
Kazakhstan would have difficulty meeting its budgetary obligations, while Russia 
might move to protect its own interests by impeding the access of Kazakh oil to 
the world market. (EURASIANET, 13 Feb 03; via www.eurasianet.org)  
 
To secure Russian interests, Kazakhstan has allowed Russia's LUKoil to expand 
activities in Kazakhstan. (INTERFAX, 1200 GMT, 10 Feb 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-
0210, via World News Connection) LUKoil also has opened an office in 
Uzbekistan to help accelerate its development of the Kandim oil and gas fields. 
(INTERFAX, 1440 GMT, 4 Feb 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-0204, via World News 
Connection) And further adding to Russia's foothold in the Central Asian energy 
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sector, Turkmen President Saparmurat Niyazov has offered Russia's Gazprom 
the opportunity to develop jointly Turkmenistan's section of the Caspian Sea. 
(ITAR-TASS, 1608 GMT, 10 Feb 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-0210, via World News 
Connection) 
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